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The Understanding of Communicative Intentions in Children with Severe-to-Profound 
Hearing Loss 
Ciara Kelly, Gary Morgan, Megan Freeth, Michael Siegal, Danielle Matthews 
 
 
Abstract 
The ability to distinguish lies from sincere false statements requires understanding a 
speaker’s communicative intentions and is argued to develop through linguistic interaction. 
We tested whether this ability was delayed in 26 children with severe-profound hearing loss 
who, based on vocabulary size, were thought to have relatively limited access to linguistic 
exchanges compared to typically-hearing peers (N = 93). Children were presented with toy 
bears who either lied or made a false statement. Despite identifying speakers’ 
knowledge/ignorance, deaf or hard of hearing (DHH) children were delayed in identifying 
lies and mistakes when matched for chronological age. When matched for receptive 
vocabulary, observed discrepancies diminished. Deaf children who experience early access to 
conversations with their deaf parents demonstrated no delay. Findings suggest limited access 
to linguistic exchanges delays the development of a key pragmatic skill. 
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The Understanding of Communicative Intentions in Children with Severe-to-Profound 
Hearing Loss  
When engaging in a conversation with another person we frequently make inferences 
about the communicative intentions behind their utterances. Pragmatics is concerned with 
understanding language in this social context. Pragmatic skills are increasingly recognised as 
essential for children’s social wellbeing (e.g., Murphy, Faulkner & Farley, 2014) motivating 
research to better understand their developmental basis (O’Neill, 2014). One important 
pragmatic skill is the ability to process a false statement by distinguishing whether it was a lie 
or a statement made in good faith (i.e., a mistake). If a speaker produces a statement that we 
know to be false, interpreting this speech act depends on gauging the speaker’s knowledge 
state (their knowledge/ignorance of the false nature of the statement) and inferring whether or 
not the communicative intention was to deceive. The current study explores the development 
of this ability in typically-hearing and deaf or hard of hearing (DHH) children with varying 
levels of language abilities.   
 
The Relationship between Pragmatic Reasoning and Mental State Understanding 
To infer a person has made a false statement in good faith we need to understand: 1) 
their knowledge state (i.e., their ignorance of the true state of affairs); and 2) their intention in 
making the statement (i.e., that it was sincere, and not intended to deceive). Conversely, to 
infer a person has told a lie we need to understand: 1) their knowledge state (i.e., their 
knowledge of the true state of affairs); and 2) their intention in making the statement (i.e., to 
create a false belief in the mind of their communicative partner - to deceive them). We first 
review the literature pertinent to the first step (understanding of the knowledge/ignorance 
states of the others) before considering the second (understanding their communicative 
intentions), which is the focus of this study.  
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Understanding of Beliefs in Typically-Hearing and DHH Children 
It is well established that typically-hearing children’s understanding of beliefs 
undergoes rapid development in the preschool years (for an overview see Apperly, 2010). 
However, less is known about what drives this development. One prominent hypothesis is 
that early conversational interaction with caregivers is critical (e.g., Astington & Baird, 
2005). Research into the developmental outcomes of DHH children supports the 
conversational-interaction hypothesis. Depending on factors that affect access to conversation 
(e.g., parents’ fluency in sign, early cochlear implantation), DHH children can experience 
anything from good to very limited access to conversations in the early years. While it is 
often the case that parental hearing status predicts performance of DHH children on social-
cognitive tasks (with DHH parents who are native signers finding it easier to interact 
conversationally with their DHH children), it is important to make clear that the underlying 
explanation for this lies with the communicative experiences that parents can offer their 
young children rather than parents’ hearing status itself.  
Regardless of whether their language environment is spoken or signed, DHH children 
who have had limited access to conversation early in life tend to be significantly delayed in 
Theory of Mind development (Courtin & Melot, 2005; Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001; 
Holmer, Heimann, & Rudner, 2016; Jones, Gutierrez, & Ludlow, 2015; Ketelaar, Rieffe, 
Wiefferink, & Frijns, 2012; Lederberg, Schick, & Spencer, 2013; Morgan & Kegl, 2006; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999, 2000; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Russell et al., 1998; 
Schick, De Villiers, De Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007; Tomasuolo, Valeri, Di Renzo, 
Pasqualetti, & Volterra, 2013; Ziv, Most, & Cohen, 2013). In contrast, DHH children who 
experience unimpeded access to early interaction generally demonstrate appropriate language 
(Schick, 2003) and Theory of Mind development (Courtin, 2000; Courtin & Melot, 2005; 
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Meristo et al., 2007; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). While most evidence regarding positive 
outcomes stems from DHH children who are native signers, there is emerging evidence that 
early cochlear implantation mitigates the risk of delayed Theory of Mind development 
(Remmel & Peters; 2008; Sundqvist, Lyxell, Jönsson & Heimann, 2014). However, although 
increasing early access to hearing technologies such as cochlear implants means the 
prevalence and extent of Theory of Mind delays is changing, continued delays are reported 
for DHH children with poor language skills (Macauley & Ford, 2006).  
 This evidence supports the hypothesis that early access to conversational interactions 
plays a crucial role in development (Astington & Baird, 2005; Hughes, 2011; Meristo, Strid, 
& Hjelmquist, 2016; Moeller & Schick, 2006; Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). Early access to 
conversation is likely important for several reasons. The need to co-ordinate attention to 
make conversation successful emphasises that others have different perspectives (e.g., 
Astington & Baird, 2005; Morisseau, Davies & Matthews, 2013). Even without explicitly 
discussing mental states, differences in perspective become clear through misunderstandings 
and unexpected utterances, and striving to reconcile these could promote the ability to 
understand the mental states of others. Furthermore, during conversation, parents sometimes 
explicitly talk about abstract concepts including mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, 
feelings and intentions. Such terms form approximately 5% of typically-hearing 19- to 28-
month-olds’ early conversational input, yet are scarcely found in the spoken input to DHH 
children (Morgan et al., 2014).  
Given the observed risk of delay in Theory of Mind in DHH children, and the 
underlying risk of reduced access to conversation, it is plausible that pragmatic skills which 
build on developing Theory of Mind and interactional experience would also be at risk. 
Indeed, there is evidence of pragmatic delay in DHH children’s early development.   
Pragmatic Development in DHH Children 
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Dammeyer (2012) studied three DHH children with cochlear implants longitudinally 
and found that despite improvements in speech production and comprehension over time, 
pragmatic skills like turn taking, responding and repairing, remained areas of pronounced 
difficulty (see also Rinaldi, Baruffaldi, Burdo & Caselli, 2013). Jeanes, Nienhuys & Rickards 
(2000) also report difficulty with managing conversational breakdowns through the use of 
clarification requests. Furthermore, using Prutting and Kirchner’s (1987) pragmatic protocol, 
Most, Shina-August & Meilijson (2010) found that DHH children (using spoken language 
only) with cochlear implants, showed reduced pragmatic ability at around 7 years of age in 
comparison to their typically-hearing peers. Such delays could be due to: 1) delayed ‘formal’ 
language acquisition having an impact on pragmatic abilities; 2) less exposure to a wide 
variety of pragmatic behaviours and communication strategies, thus fewer opportunities for 
incidental learning about the appropriate use of behaviours and strategies; and/or 3) 
difficulties in understanding the complex mental states and perspectives of others in the 
context of social interaction. 
One aspect of pragmatic competence that should be particularly impaired, if mental 
state understanding is affected, is the understanding of non-literal language including jokes, 
deception and irony. Hearing parents of young DHH adults report specific problems with 
their children’s understanding of non-literal speech (see Gregory, Bishop & Sheldon, 1995, 
for jokes & sarcasm). Two more recent studies reported by O’Reilly, Peterson & Wellman 
(2014) confirm this, with sarcasm being delayed into adulthood. Tasks assessing the 
comprehension of sarcasm require understanding that a speaker/signer thought their 
addressee would know they were not being literal (i.e., second-order Theory of Mind) and 
understanding the ironist’s attitude in producing the statement (Filippova and Astington, 
2008). This represents advanced understand of non-literal language use. It remains unclear 
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whether DHH children would also experience delays in their understanding of more basic 
speech acts including the ability to understand deception.  
The understanding that a false statement is either an intentional lie or an innocent 
mistake emerges between 3 and 5 years of age for typically-hearing children depending on 
task demands (Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998; Taylor, Lussier & Maring, 2003), and is 
known to relate to the development of first-order Theory of Mind (Bosco & Gabbatore, 
2017). Siegal & Peterson (1996) developed an engaging task that most typically-hearing 3-, 
4- and 5-year-olds are able to pass. Children were shown some contaminated food (mouldy 
bread) and two teddy bears, only one of whom could see the mould. An experimenter 
concealed the mould with Vegemite (an Australian breakfast spread), again while only one 
bear was watching and then both bears made false statements to a third party that the 
contaminated food was acceptable to eat. For each bear, children were asked whether the bear 
had or had not seen the mould and were then asked two questions: 1) did each bear know 
about the mould; and 2) did each bear lie or make a mistake. The former question assessed if 
children were aware of each bear’s knowledge/ignorance about the status of the bread. The 
latter gauged whether children could infer if the speaker’s communicative intention was to 
deceive or not. Of course, in reality the bears have neither mental states or vision however, in 
Siegal & Peterson (1996), most 3- to 5-year-olds attributed these qualities to the toys 
spontaneously.  
The Present Study 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether DHH children with reduced 
language development children, would be delayed in their ability to draw pragmatic 
inferences about the communicative intentions behind false statements. The present study 
was an extension of Siegal and Peterson (1996) using the same methods but with different 
groups of children. As the aim was to determine if children could use their understanding of 
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each bears’ knowledge state to infer the intentions behind the bears’ subsequent false 
statements, the knowledge state questions were used as control rather than test questions. 
That is, understanding the knowledge state of each bear was considered a prerequisite for 
assessing understanding of communicative intentions.  
We first tested a large group of typically-hearing children to assess ability over a wide 
age range and to facilitate matching to DHH children. We then compared the performance of 
a group of 26 DHH children to the typically-hearing children, first matching for age and then 
for language level. These children (DHH group 1) were being raised to learn spoken English 
by hearing parents and were tested at school (where English was also their primary language, 
with some sign supported English [SSE] and Total Communication [TC]). Based on their 
delayed vocabulary development, our assumption was that these children were very likely to 
have had somewhat restricted access to conversational interaction as young children. Our 
research questions were therefore: 1) whether DHH children would be delayed in 
understanding the intention to deceive when chronologically age matched with typically-
hearing peers; and 2) whether any delays would remain when children were matched on 
language age. Based on the Theory of Mind literature, we predicted that typically-hearing 
children would be able to distinguish a lie from a mistake by 7 years of age and that DHH 
group 1 would be significantly delayed in this understanding. We also predicted that 
matching by language age would diminish the difference between groups as language ability 
can be seen as a proxy measure for conversational experience (Schick et al., 2007).  
Finally, we also tested a smaller group of DHH children whose first language was 
British Sign Language (BSL). These children (DHH group 2) each had two fluent signing 
deaf parents and used BSL as their primary language at school. We assumed that DHH group 
2 would have had good access to communication in early childhood, although this was not 
tested and given the small sample size, the related analyses are exploratory in nature. Our 
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final research question was therefore: 3) whether these native signing children would differ 
from their typically-hearing peers on task performance. We predicted that they would not 
show a delay. It is important to note that this hypothesis was based on assumed access to 
conversation based on teacher-reported family circumstances. Not all deaf parents use a 
signed language with their deaf children. Stuckless and Birch (1997) report from 
questionnaires on the use of manual communication, that 5 out of 71 deaf parents of deaf 
children in their sample did not use a signed language (see also Mitchiner, 2015). In cases of 
poor access to communication (in whatever modality) it is likely there would be delay. That 
is, we predict that it is access to conversation that affects pragmatic development, not the 
hearing status of parents or mode of communication per se.  
Method 
Participants 
For pragmatic reasons (i.e., time and resource restrictions), participants were recruited 
using convenience sampling, from schools within relatively close proximity to the research 
team. Fourteen schools in the United Kingdom were invited to take part in the present study, 
with 13 schools accepting and 1 mainstream school declining participation as they did not 
wish for children to be withdrawn from teaching. The 13 schools who took part were 
comprised of: 2 pre-schools, 2 mainstream schools, 1 University Summer Programme, 6 
mainstream schools with an integrated resource facility for DHH children, and 2 specialist 
schools for DHH children. Two of the mainstream schools with an integrated resource facility 
for DHH children and 1 of the specialist schools for DHH children had taken part in previous 
research with the same experimenter. The ages targeted were within the ranges reported in 
the original Siegal & Peterson (1996) study on the development of understanding of lies and 
mistakes, and in previous Theory of Mind related research on DHH children with a range of 
language learning backgrounds. Ninety-three typically-hearing children and 36 DHH children 
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(26 children in DHH group 1 and 10 children in DHH group 2) were included in this study. A 
further 7 children were excluded because they either failed at least 1 control question (1 child 
in DHH group 1 aged 5;3 and 3 typically-hearing children aged 3;9, 4;4 and 5;7) or they had 
a language age below 3 years and might not have understood the test questions (3 children in 
DHH group 1 aged 5;6, 8;11 and 10;3 with language ages of 2;11, 2;11, and 2;10 
respectively). The control questions and methods to establish language-age are described in 
detail in the next section. All children had informed parental consent to participate. None of 
the DHH children were reported to have a developmental disorder. 
 The 93 typically-hearing children (54 girls and 39 boys) were aged between 3;0 and 
11;7 (mean = 6;9). They attended either a pre-school, mainstream school, the University 
Summer Programme or a mainstream school with an integrated resource facility for DHH 
children. None of the typically-hearing children were reported to have a developmental 
disorder, hearing loss or language delay. The 26 children in DHH group 1 (10 girls and 16 
boys) were aged between 6;6 and 11;7 (mean = 9;7) and the 10 children in DHH group 2 (5 
girls and 5 boys) were aged between 4;8 and 11;5 (mean = 8;4). The DHH children had 
severe (from 65dB) to profound (over 90dB) bilateral hearing losses. In DHH group 1,  
deafness was congenital for 25 children, and was diagnosed at 18 months for the remaining 1 
child. In this group, 11 children wore bilateral hearing aids, 4 children had bilateral cochlear 
implants, 4 had unilateral cochlear implants and 7 had 1 cochlear implant and 1 hearing aid. 
Age at implantation ranged between 1;6 and 8;2 (mean = 4;5). For all children in DHH group 
2, deafness was congenital and all children had two deaf parents, with 7 having at least one 
deaf sibling. These children were fluent BSL users. All wore bilateral hearing aids except for 
1 child who did not use any individual amplification systems due to the severity of his 
hearing loss.  
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Schools used various modes of communication: spoken English, SSE, TC, and BSL. 
Deaf or hard of hearing group 2 used BSL in school, while DHH group 1 used either English 
only or English with some SSE and/or TC. Before testing, schools advised the experimenter 
what each child’s primary mode of communication was at school and home, which was used 
for testing. All children in DHH group 1 were tested using spoken English by the first author. 
All children in DHH group 2 were tested in BSL by a classroom assistant fluent in BSL in the 
presence of the first author (whose BSL was sufficient to check the procedure was followed 
appropriately). Further details can be found in Table 1.  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Materials  
 The British Picture Vocabulary Scale ll (BPVS II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 
1997) was used to test the receptive spoken English vocabulary of the children in DHH group 
1. Following Siegal & Peterson (1996) three teddy bears, mouldy bread and jam were used 
for the lies/mistakes test. 
Procedure 
 Each child was tested individually in one session lasting approximately 20 minutes 
wearing their usual hearing technologies (this was confirmed with either their teacher or 
classroom assistant). All children participated in the lies/mistakes test with children in DHH 
group 1 tested in English and children in DHH group 2 tested in BSL by a fluent signer, as 
described previously. The children in DHH group 2 were not assessed on language since we 
did not have access to a standardised test of signed vocabulary. The children in DHH group 1 
were tested on the BPVS II and the lies/mistakes test with the order of tests alternating across 
participants. For the lies/mistakes test, all children were seated at a table alongside the 
experimenter. Following the original methodology, the experimenter described the task 
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saying/signing “I am going to tell you a story about 3 teddy bears and then I will ask you a 
few questions. Is that OK?” All children consented to continue. The children were then asked 
to watch/listen carefully to the story. Following this, the experimenter introduced Ben the 
bear who had his back turned to both experimenter and child and was reading a book whilst 
also listening to music through headphones. It was emphasised that Ben could not see or hear 
the experimenter or the child because he was turned away reading and listening to music. 
This ruled out the possibility that the child might believe Ben could somehow witness the 
scenario. A second bear (of a different colour) was then introduced as Tom and was placed in 
front of both child and experimenter as an onlooker. To ensure the child knew that this bear 
could see and hear events, the experimenter stated, “Tom is watching what we’re doing. He 
can see and hear us”. 
Following the introduction of the bears, the experimenter presented a mouldy piece of 
bread into the story stating, “Here is a mouldy old piece of bread! Is it OK to eat or not OK to 
eat?” Following the child’s response (which was in all cases that it was not OK), the 
experimenter said, “Let’s put some jam over the mould so we can’t see it. Let’s hide the 
mould.” The experimenter then stated, “Now, before I go on with the story do you think one 
of these bears is naughty or not naughty?” Children were asked this question to determine if 
they had any preconceptions about either bear. If a child replied that neither bear was 
naughty, the experimenter continued with the story. If a child said, “yes, one is naughty”, 
they were then asked, “Which one is naughty?” If they chose one of the bears, they were then 
asked, “why?”  For all groups most children said/signed neither bear was naughty in equal 
numbers. 
The experimenter continued by saying/signing, “Now, let’s get back to the story” and 
introduced a third teddy bear. “This is a friend who is hungry and would like to eat the bread, 
he asks if the bread is OK to eat”. Pointing to the bear with his back turned (the uninformed 
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bear) the experimenter stated, “Ben did not see the mould on the bread”. The child was then 
asked a control question, “Does Ben know about the mould?” Following the child’s response, 
the experimenter continued, “Ok, so Ben did not see the mould on the bread. He said that it is 
OK to eat the bread”. The child was then asked the test question, “Did Ben lie or make a 
mistake?” Pointing to the onlooker bear the experimenter then stated, “Tom did see the 
mould on the bread, he was watching us”. The child was then asked a second control 
question, “Does Tom know about the mould?” Following the child’s response the 
experimenter continued by saying “Ok, so Tom did see the mould on the bread. He said that 
it is OK to eat the bread”. This was followed by the test question, “Did Tom lie or make a 
mistake?” The control and test questions were counterbalanced for order across participants 
and the lie and mistake target responses were alternated across participants (i.e. for half of the 
trials the experimenter asked “did [bear’s name] lie or make a mistake?” whereas for the 
other she asked “did [bear’s name] make a mistake or lie?”). The experimenter then asked a 
final test question by pointing between Ben and Tom and saying “Do you think one of these 
bears is naughty?” If a child said yes, they were then asked “Which one is naughty?” If the 
child selected the bear they thought was naughty, they were then asked “Why?”  
There were various ways we checked if children followed the experiment. We used 
the BPVS II to check whether children were able to understand the language used in the test 
scenario. Only children who had a language age of 3 years and above were included in 
analyses. The control questions are considered a prerequisite for making a pragmatic 
inference about the speaker’s communicative intention (to deceive or not), which is assessed 
by the lie/mistake test questions. Consequently, children who failed the question “does X 
know about the mould?” were not included in the analysis. By asking additional test 
questions about whether either of the bears were naughty we checked that failure to answer 
test questions was not because of language. The word ‘naughty’ is a higher frequency word in 
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British child directed speech than the terms ‘lie’ or ‘mistake’ as verified by a corpus search 
using the Manchester Corpus available on CHILDES (Theakston, Lieven, Pine & Rowland, 
2001). 
Coding 
Children’s responses to all questions were scored live by the experimenter (the first 
author). Responses to all test questions by all children in both groups were scored as correct 
or incorrect. Questions in BSL required only a YES/NO answer and so the same 
experimenter scored these. Responses to the final test question, “Do you think one of these 
bears is naughty?” were coded as correct if the child said yes and selected the onlooker bear 
in answer to the follow-up question, “Which one is naughty?”. Responses were coded as 
incorrect if the child stated that yes one was naughty and selected the uninformed bear in 
answer to the follow-up question, or of the child stated that neither bear was naughty. 
Justifications as to why either bear was naughty were coded as correct if the child: 1) had 
identified the onlooker bear in the naughty test question; and 2) explained that the onlooker 
bear told a lie or had stated that the bread was OK to eat even though it was not. Incorrect 
justifications included children stating that the uninformed bear was the naughty bear because 
he wasn’t looking and/or he was listening to music. If children gave no justification, even if 
they correctly identified the onlooker bear in the naughty test question, justification was 
coded as incorrect for the purposes of analysis. Finally, an overall score out of 4 was 
calculated for each child, with 1 point for each test question answered correctly (this included 
the justification question). 
We were unable to carry out inter-coder reliability because during data collection 
schools did not allow recording of the testing. However, children gave binary responses (i.e., 
saying either lie or mistake) and there was very little room for qualitative explanation from 
the children. This meant there was no need for the coder to interpret responses (i.e., it was 
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clear whether the child thought there was a lie, or a mistake). Furthermore, the experimenter 
followed a script for questions (see Appendix 1). In order for other researchers to replicate 
our methodology, the script and original dataset is deposited in the University of Sheffield's 
open access Online Research Data Repository (ORDA). Please contact D. Mathews for 
details: danielle.matthews@sheffield.ac.uk.   
Results 
We first consider the performance of the typically-hearing children. We then compare 
this with DHH group 1 when chronologically age matched and when matched according to 
language age. Finally, we consider the performance of the smaller DHH group 2.  
Typically-hearing children’s performance on each test question increased with 
chronological age and was at ceiling by 7 years of age (see Figure 1). Three logistic 
regression analyses confirmed that chronological age significantly predicted children’s 
performance on the mistake test question, (χ²(1) = 16.23, p < .001. Nagelkerke’s R2 = .280), 
the lie test question, (χ²(1) = 20.99, p < .001. Nagelkerke’s R2 = .364) and the naughty test 
question, (χ²(1) = 34.31, p < .001. Nagelkerke’s R2 = .464). Each child’s language age 
equivalent was derived from their raw scores on the BPVS II. Language age and 
chronological age were positively correlated, r = .92, p < .001. 
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Each child in DHH group 1 was matched with a typically-hearing child of the same 
chronological age (in years and months). Details of this matching are given in Table 2. When 
matched for chronological age, DHH group 1 had a significantly lower language age (M = 
5.95 years, SD = 1.72 years) than the typically-hearing group (M = 10.25 years, SD = 1.98 
years), t(50) = 8.35, p < .001. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of children correctly answering the test questions as 
a function of hearing status. Chi-square analyses for each test question revealed a significant 
association between hearing status and pass rates for the mistake (χ²(1) = 8.09, p < .01), the 
lie (χ²(1) = 12.38, p < .001) and the naughty bear post-test questions (χ²(1) = 19.16, p < .001). 
Likewise, when comparing children’s total score out of 4, typically-hearing children 
performed significantly better (M = 4.00, SD = 0.00) than DHH group 1 (M = 2.15, SD = 
1.46), t(25) = 6.44, p < .001. 
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
To test whether language ability could account for differences in ability to detect lies 
and mistakes, each child in DHH group 1 was matched with a typically-hearing child with the 
same language age (in years and months) derived from BPVS II (see Table 3). 
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of children correctly answering the test question as a 
function of hearing status. When matched according to language age chi square analyses 
revealed that there were no significant differences in ability to respond to any of the test 
questions. Furthermore, a t-test on children’s total score out of 4 revealed that the typically-
hearing group’s scores (M = 2.77, SD = 1.63) and the DHH group 1’s scores (M = 2.15, SD = 
1.46) were not significantly different, t(50) = 1.43, p = .158 (d = 0.40). 
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
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Figure 4 shows the percentage of correct responses for the 10 children in DHH group 
2 and a group of 10 typically-hearing children who were chronologically age matched. As 
can be seen, the children in DHH group 2 follow a numerically identical pattern of results as 
the typically-hearing group.  
 
---Figure 4 about here --- 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether DHH children would be delayed in the ability 
to distinguish a lie from a mistake. The typically-hearing children in the current study 
reached ceiling on a test of this ability by 7 years of age, in line with previous studies (Siegal 
& Peterson, 1996). We assumed DHH group 1 would have had somewhat limited access to 
linguistic exchanges than their typically-hearing peers, based on the fact that they had hearing 
parents and had delayed receptive vocabulary in their first language (English). Children in 
DHH group 1 had substantial difficulty with the lies/mistakes task when compared with 
typically-hearing children of the same chronological age. This group difference was 
diminished when children were matched by language age. There are two possible 
interpretations for this set of results. 
The first possibility is that the DHH children in group 1 had difficulty understanding 
the lexical items specific to the test questions (i.e., the words ‘lie’, ‘mistake’). On this account 
children cannot label the misdemeanours they observe even though they understand the 
communicative intentions. We were careful to exclude any children with a language age 
below 3 years for whom a verbal test may not be appropriate. We also included an additional 
question about which bear was ‘naughty’ (a high frequency word in British English) to 
diminish reliance on the terms ‘lie’ and ‘mistake’. However, DHH children in group 1 were 
DHH CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF LIES AND MISTAKES 17 
still delayed in their understanding of how lies and mistakes differ. Future studies might 
consider training children in the understanding of the term ‘naughty’ in a different domain 
(i.e., a misdemeanour that does not involve mental states). One could then be more confident 
that the lexical item had been understood and any incorrect responses were specific to 
understanding communicative intentions.  
We argue a more likely interpretation of the results is that the DHH children in group 
1 had a genuine delay in pragmatic development. Although children were aware of which 
bear was knowledgeable they were less able to take the extra step of reasoning about his 
communicative intentions (i.e., that he was being deliberately deceptive). The most likely 
explanation for this pragmatic delay would be limited access to conversations involving 
similar real world scenarios compared to the typically-hearing children (Jeanes et al., 2000; 
Meristo et al., 2016; Most et al., 2010; Rinaldi et al., 2013). Conversational experience could 
be effective in three specific ways. First, it could promote the understanding that interlocutors 
have contrasting perspectives and motives. Second, conversation could provide incidental 
exposure to lies and mistakes. Third, conversation could include explicit meta-linguistic talk 
about lying (or being mistaken) and the intentions behind it (Morgan et al., 2014).  
When the DHH children in group 1 were matched for receptive vocabulary with 
typically-hearing children, the observed discrepancy between groups disappeared. Children’s 
scores on the vocabulary measure can be seen as a proxy-measure for the richness of previous 
language exposure, albeit a crude one. Previous studies have consistently found that 
vocabulary comprehension is a predictor of false belief test performance in DHH and 
typically-hearing children (e.g., Schick et al., 2007). The present study suggests the same is 
true for the ability to distinguish lies and mistakes. This is consistent with studies of 
pragmatic ability in typically and atypically developing children, where formal and pragmatic 
language skills are observed to be correlated (e.g., Matthews, Biney, & Abbot-Smith, 2018; 
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Norbury, 2014). It is important to note that 11 of the 26 DHH children in group 1 did not 
have cochlear implants, rather bilateral hearing aids. It stands to reason that this group could 
be particularly limited in terms of access to conversational interaction and their language 
acquisition. However, although cochlear implants offer increased access to sound, cochlear 
implants do not necessarily ensure language abilities will be within normal limits (see 
Vlastarakos et al., 2010 for a meta-analytic review of infants with cochlear implants and their 
outcomes). Nor do cochlear implants ensure typical pragmatic development. Most et al. 
(2010) found no differences in pragmatic abilities between children with cochlear implants 
and children with hearing aids in childhood. In the current study, the majority of children 
who did have cochlear implants did not receive these early. It is possible that early implanted 
children may perform better on the task given their early increased access to language, 
however findings from Rinaldi et al. (2013) suggests that even early implanted children have 
poor basic pragmatic skills in the first years of life. Therefore, we ran a t-test comparing 
children with hearing aids to children with cochlear implants on their language scores (BPVS 
II scores) and there was no significant difference (t(24) = -0.01, p = .995, means (SD) = 70.36 
(10.86) and 70.40 (16.40) respectively).  
It is interesting to note that 25 of the 26 DHH children in group 1 passed the control 
questions concerning each bear’s knowledge state. These control questions required some 
social-cognitive skill, namely being aware that seeing leads to knowing and conversely not 
seeing results in ignorance (an ability that typically develops around 3 years of age; Hogrefe, 
Wimmer & Perner, 1986; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). This emphasises that more complex 
reasoning about others’ communicative intentions does not follow as a matter of course 
(O’Reilly, Peterson & Wellman, 2014). That is, being aware of others’ mental states and 
using this awareness to make inferences about communicative intentions are separable 
abilities. 
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 A more detailed measure of children’s communicative experiences with their parents 
would have provided a clearer profile of each group’s access to conversational interaction. 
Future studies could ask parents via a questionnaire how often they communicated with their 
children about people’s beliefs, intentions and speech acts such as jokes, mistakes, lies and 
sarcasm. They could also ask about communication in the home more broadly (the modalities 
used and the parents' self-assessed fluency). The present study reported the signing skills of 
deaf parents (i.e., fluent BSL) but details of the children in DHH group 1 were restricted to 
sign or oral and not if, and how often parents used SSE and/or TC.  
 In the present study, the DHH children in group 2 were reported by teachers to have 
age-appropriate language. This would not necessarily be the case for all DHH children who 
use BSL as their first language. However, for the 10 children in this study, both parents were 
deaf, most had deaf siblings and all used BSL fluently at school, suggesting early access to a 
fluent language model. Although a small group, these children performed at the same level as 
typically-hearing children of the same chronological age, suggesting that they might 
demonstrate a similar developmental trajectory to their typically-hearing peers. However, the 
sample size was small and most children tested were over 7 years of age. A larger group of 
children covering a broader range of ages would therefore be necessary to draw strong 
conclusions about developmental trajectories. 
The significant delays in pragmatic development present in the larger DHH group 
highlights that there is a substantial risk of communicative delays for DHH children who are 
delayed in their language abilities and likely experience somewhat limited access to language 
in the early years. Such delays can have negative consequences for real world social 
wellbeing (Peterson, Slaughter, Moore, & Wellman, 2016). There is therefore a need to 
consider how best to support children’s development. Although some research on supporting 
communication skills has been reported (Holzinger, Fellinger & Beitel, 2011; Moeller, 2000; 
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Rees, Mahon, Herman, Newton, Craig & Marriage, 2015; Yoshinaga-Itano, Sedey, Coulter & 
Mehl, 1998), the field would benefit from more evidence to inform practitioners about how to 
support DHH children’s wider social-cognitive and pragmatic development.  
In sum, mean scores for 26 DHH children indicated that they had experienced limited 
access to conversation (based on observed vocabulary delay). As a group, mean task scores 
also pointed to a delay in their ability to distinguish lies from mistakes. Delayed pragmatic 
development can have profound consequences for interactions with others and the current 
findings along with a growing body of longitudinal and experimental studies suggest that 
DHH children who, for various reasons, have reduced access to early conversational 
interaction would be particularly vulnerable to this. Future research should consider the 
viability of interventions to promote conversational interaction for DHH children and test 
whether such interventions are effective in promoting three areas of development: mental 
state understanding, formal language, and pragmatics.  
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Table 1 
 
Schools’ Communication Methods and Children’s Primary Mode of Communication 
Note. Modes of communication reported in brackets = children’s secondary mode of communication. DHH G1 = deaf or hard of hearing children 
group 1. DHH G2 = deaf or hard of hearing children group 2. Bilingual = BSL and spoken English. 
School Type 
 
 
Schools’ Methods of Communication Children’s Primary 
Mode of Communication 
DHH 
G1 (n) 
DHH 
G2 (n) 
Specialist Facility (n=3) Spoken English (oral/aural approach only) Spoken English Only 5 NAa 
Specialist Facility (n=3) SSE, BSL and spoken English, where appropriate (child 
centred approach to communication). Aim is to support 
development of speech and language 
Spoken English Only 3 0 
  Spoken English (+SSE) 5 0 
  BSL 0 3 
  Bilingual 0 3 
Specialist School (n=1) TC, SSE and BSL, offering a child centred approach to 
communication 
Spoken English (+TC) 2 0 
  BSL (+some TC) 0 1 
  Bilingual 0 1 
Specialist School (n=1) SSE, BSL and spoken English, where appropriate (child 
centred approach to communication) 
Spoken English (+some 
SSE) 
11 0 
  BSL 0 2 
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aNo DHH children in group 2 attended these schools. 
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Table 2 
Chronological Age Matching of Participants 
 Typically-Hearing Group DHH Group 1 
n 26 26 
Mean Chronological Age 
(SD) 
 
9 years, 7 months 
(1 year, 3 months) 
9 years, 7 months 
(1 year, 4 months) 
 
Mean Language Age 
Equivalent (SD) 
 
10 years, 4 months 
(1 year, 11 months) 
5 years, 11 months 
(1 year, 8 months) 
 
Chronological Age Range 6 years, 6 months – 11 
years, 7 months 
 
6 years, 6 months – 11 years,  
7 months 
Language Age Equivalent  
Range 
7 years, 3 months – 15 
years, 4 months 
3 years, 0 months – 9 years, 
11 months 
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Table 3 
Language Age Matching of Participants 
 Typically-Hearing Group DHH Group 1 
n 26 26 
Mean Language Age 
Equivalent (SD) 
5 years, 11 months 
(1 year, 7 months) 
5 years, 11 months 
(1 year, 8 months) 
Mean Chronological Age 
(SD) 
5 years, 5 months 
(1 year, 10 months) 
9 years, 7 months 
(1 year, 4 months) 
Language Age Equivalent 
Range 
3 years, 3 months – 9 years, 
11 months 
3 years, 0 months – 9 years, 
11 months 
Chronological Age Range 3 years, 0 months – 9 years, 
10 months 
6 years, 6 months – 11 years, 
7 months 
  
DHH CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF LIES AND MISTAKES 32 
 
  
DHH CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF LIES AND MISTAKES 33 
 
 
  
DHH CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF LIES AND MISTAKES 34 
 
 
 
  
DHH CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF LIES AND MISTAKES 35 
 
